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Montoro: People v. Dubarry

PEOPLE V. DUBARRY – AN EXPLORATION INTO THE
COMPLEXITIES OF CHARGING A DEFENDANT WITH BOTH
INTENTIONAL MURDER AND DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE
MURDER
Arielle Montoro*

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
PEOPLE V. DUBARRY1
(DECIDED APRIL 7, 2015)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent New York Court of Appeals case, People v.
Dubarry, the court attempted to resolve an issue that was disputed
among the Appellate Division Departments for many years.2
Specifically, the court considered whether the trier of fact could
convict a defendant for both intentional murder premised on the
transferred intent theory and depraved indifference murder when the
trial court submitted such charges in the conjunctive.3 The Court of
Appeals previously rendered decisions on this same issue, but its
ambiguous and fact-specific opinions led to differing interpretations
and the Appellate Division split.4 The New York Court of Appeals
*

J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. in Criminal
Justice – Law Enforcement Technology, magna cum laude, Farmingdale State College,
2012. I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her dedication and guidance not
only on this note, but throughout my law school career. I would also like to thank my
editors, Julia Ansanelli and Rhona Mae Amorado, for their extraordinary input, patience, and
assistance with my case note. Additionally, I would love to thank my family and friends,
especially my parents, for their unconditional love and support throughout law school.
1
31 N.E.3d 86 (N.Y. 2015).
2
See discussion infra Section V.
3
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 93.
4
For example, the Second Department held that the trier of fact could convict the
defendant of both depraved indifference and intentional murder, while the Third Department
held that the jury could not convict a defendant of both intentional and depraved indifference
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attempted to resolve this issue in Dubarry when it held that the jury
cannot convict a defendant of both depraved indifference and
intentional murder for a single murder.5
This note will provide an analytical review of Dubarry and
further discuss how the Court of Appeals did not, in the long run,
resolve the split among the Appellate Division Departments in New
York. Specifically, this note argues that the court should charge a
defendant with multiple murder charges alternatively. However, if
the counts are non-murder counts, then it is possible for the court to
charge the defendant with such charges conjunctively. In Part II, this
note will provide an overview of the Dubarry decision, including the
relevant facts and the court’s discussion. Part III will examine the
transferred intent theory in detail. In Part IV, this note will analyze
the previous New York Court of Appeals cases, specifically People v.
Gallagher6 and People v. Trappier,7 which discussed a similar issue
that was set forth in Dubarry. Part V will then examine the split
among the Departments of the Appellate Division—specifically, the
cases that discussed the issue presented in Dubarry, as well as the
similarities and differences among the Appellate Division rulings.
Also in Part V, this note will explore the impact of the Dubarry
decision on the prior Appellate Division cases. In Part VI, this note
will consider the background for charging defendants with depraved
indifference murder in New York. Lastly, Part VII will analyze
Dubarry’s impact on future cases.
II.

DISCUSSION OF DUBARRY

The facts in Dubarry were in dispute at the time of trial. The
State and the Defendant each presented its version of the story and
the following sections will present both versions. Additionally, the
procedural history and the court’s analysis and holding are examined
below.

murder. See People v. Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010); People v.
Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2010).
5
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95.
6
508 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1987).
7
660 N.E.2d 1131 (N.Y. 1995).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/9

2

Montoro: People v. Dubarry

2017

PEOPLE V. DUBARRY
A.

491

State’s Version of the Facts

The State alleged that Herburtho Benjamin (“Codefendant”)
and ten other men were in Brooklyn, New York, and approached a
residential building while searching for someone who assaulted one
of them.8 The men proceeded inside the lobby where they saw
Darius Dubarry (“Defendant”), a member of a religious group known
as the Lek Leh Israelites,9 who had just finished his Sabbath
services.10 Once the Defendant walked past the group of men outside
the building one of the men stated, “That’s him.”11 Some of the men
testified that they saw the Defendant and the Codefendant “pull out
guns and shoot at one another.”12 The State also obtained video
footage from the building’s surveillance camera, which showed the
shootout and the Defendant “extending his arm to fire a gun before he
reentered the building.”13 The forensic evidence further established
that the Defendant fired the bullet that killed the victim “who was
uninvolved in the events and innocently standing a few buildings
away from the shooting.”14
Not long after the shooting, the Defendant left the crime
scene, and about a week later, investigators found the Defendant in a
hotel in the State of Georgia under an assumed name.15 The
investigators obtained statements from the Defendant in which he
explained that directly prior to the shooting, he was leaving his
religious services.16 He stated that he saw the men in the lobby
follow him outside the building where the Codefendant pointed a gun
at him.17 The Defendant said he “heard a click, and then a shot[,]”
8

Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89.
This group is more commonly known as the “Black Israelites.” See Glenn Blain, State
Court of Appeals Overturns Murder Conviction for Man Involved in Brooklyn Nurse’s Death
from
Gun
Battle, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:30
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/court-appeals-overturns-murder-conviction-gunbattle-article-1.2177113.
10
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. The innocent victim was a thirty-five-year-old nurse and a mother of a nine-year old
son. See Veronika Belenkaya, Tina Moore, & Bill Hutchinson, Son Grieves Over Death of
Mother,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Dec.
18,
2007,
2:26
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/son-grieves-death-mother-article-1.274873.
15
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89.
16
Id.
17
Id.
9
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which caused him to shoot back and run into the building.18 The
State also obtained eyewitness testimony from one of the residents
who lived in the building who stated he saw the Defendant fire first at
the Codefendant.19
B.

Defendant’s Version of the Facts

At trial, the Defendant testified that the Codefendant was the
initial shooter and “shot . . . for no apparent reason.”20 The
Defendant testified that he had a gun in his possession because he
was keeping it from a member of his congregation.21 According to
the Defendant, this member showed the Defendant a gun and said he
had to handle a situation.22 The Defendant told him to “chill out,”
took the weapon, and said he would dispose of it later.23
The Defendant then saw the men in the lobby and thought he
recognized one of them as a resident of the building.24 The
Defendant explained he was smoking a cigarette in front of the
building when the ten men accompanying the Codefendant went
outside.25 The Defendant turned to enter the building and heard
someone say, “Move. Move. Move.”26 He turned again and saw the
Codefendant “pointing a gun at him.”27 The Defendant alleged that
he did not know who the Codefendant was, and that he “froze when
he saw the gun.”28 The Defendant stated the Codefendant “pulled the
trigger twice, but the gun failed to fire,” and when the Codefendant
fired again, the Defendant fired multiple shots back.29 The Defendant
claimed he never handled a gun previously and did not know where
18

Id.
Id. at 89-90. The witness testified during the grand jury proceeding, but not at trial.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89-90. This witness testified that he saw the Defendant fire the first
shot at the Codefendant. Id. The witness, however, refused to testify at trial because of his
belief that the Defendant was behind alleged threats made against the witness’s family. Id.
Following a hearing to determine whether the Defendant was responsible for such threats,
the court held that the Defendant was not responsible for them. Id.
20
Id.
21
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 90.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 91.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
19
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he placed the gun after the shooting.30 He stated he returned to his
apartment, and two days later, went to Georgia out of fear.31 He
believed all the men were gang members, and fleeing to Georgia
would allow enough time for his family to find an attorney.32
Additionally, he alleged that the police coerced him to make false
statements.33
C.

Procedural Background

At the pre-charge conference, and while discussing the verdict
sheet, the trial court noted that intentional murder and depraved
indifference murder were separate and distinct crimes; thus, the jury
would consider both charges together.34 Defense counsel argued that
there was insufficient evidence to establish depraved indifference
murder because the Defendant participated in mutual combat with the
Codefendant.35
Nevertheless, the court submitted both charges to the jury in
the conjunctive, among other charges, with the intentional murder
charge submitted on a transferred intent theory.36 The court
30

Id.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. While the physical act required for both intentional murder and depraved
indifference murder is the same, the requisite mental state differs. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125. 25(1) (McKinney 2016). Both types of murder require the physical act of killing
another person. Id. at 125.25(2). However, while intentional murder requires the defendant
to possess a mental state of intent to kill the victim, depraved indifference requires the
defendant to recklessly engage in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and such death
occurs because of the conduct. Id. Depraved indifference is its own culpable mental state
and exists when a defendant possesses “an utter disregard for the value of human life—a
willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply does not care
whether grievous harm results or not.” People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (N.Y.
2006) (quoting People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2005) (internal quotations
omitted)).
35
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91. Mutual combat is defined as “[a] consensual fight on equal
terms — arising from a moment of passion but not in self-defense — between two persons
armed with deadly weapons.” Mutual Combat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
The mutual combat aspect is relevant because if two defendants acted in mutual combat with
each other, the court would reduce the murder charge to voluntary manslaughter, which is a
lesser crime than murder. Id.
36
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91. Depraved indifference is defined in the New York Penal
Law: “A person is guilty of murder in the second degree [under depraved indifference]
when . . . [u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and
31
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instructed the jury to consider the depraved indifference murder
charge, and irrespective of its determination on that count, to next
consider whether the defendant committed intentional murder.37
Thus, the court left open the possibility that the jury could convict the
Defendant of two forms of murder, each of which requires a different
mental state for the same single act of murder.
Subsequently, the jury convicted the Defendant of multiple
charges, including intentional and depraved indifference murder.38
The Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division, Second
Department, affirmed.39 The Second Department stated that, while
the murder convictions were each based on different states of mind
with regard to the different victims, there was “more than one
potential victim[,]” which allowed the Defendant’s murder
convictions to stand.40 Soon after, a New York Court of Appeals
judge granted the Defendant leave to appeal.41
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Defendant claimed
that the trial court violated his constitutionally protected due process
rights when it submitted the depraved indifference murder charge and
the intentional murder charge based on a transferred intent theory
conjunctively to the jury.42 The Defendant argued that “where the
actual and intended victims are different,” a conviction of both
intentional murder and depraved indifference murder “subjects him to
multiple criminal liability for a single homicide.”43
The State asserted that each murder count required different
culpable mental states; thus, the court should affirm the convictions.44
In support of its argument, the State explained that a conviction of
intentional murder required the State to prove the Defendant’s intent
thereby causes the death of another person . . . .” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney
2016) (emphasis added). By contrast, a person is guilty of murder in the second degree
under New York Penal Law when “he intends to cause the death of someone, and he causes
the death of such person or third person under transferred intent.” Id. at § 125.25(1)
(emphasis added). The transferred intent theory, therefore, allows the defendant to be
criminally liable for his or her actions, even though the intended victim was not the person
harmed. Id.
37
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 91.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 92.
42
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 92.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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to cause the death of the intended victim (here, the Codefendant)
beyond a reasonable doubt.45 In contrast, the conviction of depraved
indifference murder required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the
Defendant’s recklessness by creating a grave risk of death to the
actual victim “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference
to human life, resulting in the victim’s death.”46
D.

Court of Appeals Discussion in Dubarry

The New York Court of Appeals, reversing the Second
Department’s decision, held that it was improper for the court to
submit the intentional murder and depraved indifference murder
charges in the conjunctive, and therefore, the jury could not convict
the Defendant of both depraved indifference and intentional murder.47
The court agreed with the Defendant and determined that “on the
facts of this case,” the State could not employ the theory of
transferred intent to convict the Defendant twice for the killing of the
same victim.48
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry began its analysis by
examining People v. Gallagher in which the court held that “in single
homicide cases, intentional and depraved indifference murder counts
must be submitted to the jury in the alternative.”49 The Gallagher
court explained that an act is either intended or not intended by its
actors; it cannot be both.50 The Dubarry court further discussed the
transferred intent theory, explaining that a defendant can be
responsible for the death of a person even if it was not the person the
defendant intended to kill.51 The Dubarry court established that the
holding in Gallagher equally applies when the State proceeds on a
transferred intent theory.52 The court in Dubarry stated:
Whether based on the defendant’s conscious objective
towards the intended victim, or on a transferred intent
theory directed at a different, and actual, victim, [the]
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 94.
Id.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95.
Id. at 92.
Id.; see Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d 909.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 92 (quoting Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910).
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 93.
Id. at 94.
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defendant’s conviction depends on a jury finding that
[the] defendant harbored the requisite intentional
mental state. [The d]efendant cannot then also be
guilty of the same murder premised on a depraved
state of mind.53
The court explained that whether the Defendant acted with intent to
kill one victim or whether he acted with the intent, on the transferred
intent theory, to kill a different victim had no effect on whether the
jury could convict the defendant of both depraved indifference
murder and intentional murder.54 In either case, the court stated the
answer to such question was still no.55
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry acknowledged that the State
had two alternative means by which it could establish the
Defendant’s state of mind: (1) by proving transferred intent or (2) by
proving depraved indifference to human life.56 Further, the Dubarry
court explained that the Defendant’s state of mind was for the jury to
determine.57 However, the court stated that because recklessness is a
culpable mens rea, different from the intentional murder mens rea,
allowing both murder charges prevents the jury from determining the
defendant’s state of mind at the time the act was committed.58
In Dubarry, the State unsuccessfully argued that Gallagher
did not apply because two outcomes could result to two different
individuals––the actual and intended victims—and urged the court to
rely on People v. Trappier.59 In Trappier, the Court of Appeals
upheld a defendant’s conviction of attempted first-degree assault and
first-degree reckless endangerment when the defendant fired multiple
shots towards his intended victim.60 The Trappier court noted the
defendant may have intended to cause serious physical injury, while
also recklessly creating a grave risk that a more serious result, like
death, could occur from his act.61 The court in Trappier held that

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id.
Id.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94-95.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 94-95 (quoting Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133).
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“the separate mens rea of intent and recklessness are not mutually
exclusive when applied to different outcomes.”62
The Dubarry court distinguished the facts before it from those
in Trappier, holding that while two different states of mind
accompanied the murder counts, only one outcome resulted: the
victim’s death.63 The Court of Appeals explained that the transferred
intent theory has two components:64 First, “to establish an intentional
conscious objective to cause the death of another[,]” and second, to
establish that the “shooting resulted in death.”65 Therefore, the
Dubarry court emphasized that under the transferred intent theory, it
was crucial for the State to establish the intent to kill, and a resulting
death which means that “the identity of the victim was irrelevant.”66
The court ultimately concluded that the State focused too much on
the identity of the intended victim, and not on the requisite mental
state.67 Therefore, the State “ignore[d] the essence of intentional
murder based on transferred intent.”68
Thus, the Dubarry court ruled that Gallagher was the
controlling precedent and explained that the Defendant could only be
guilty of depraved indifference murder or intentional murder with the
transferred intent theory.69 While the Court of Appeals held that
Gallagher controlled, the court did not overrule Trappier, in which
the court held that it could charge the defendant with both an
intentional assault charge and a reckless assault charge in the
conjunctive.70 Therefore, Trappier still remains good law today.
However, it may be challenging for the Appellate Divisions to
determine which rule of law applies because Gallagher and Trappier
present different circumstances. If there are two murder charges with
different mens rea, should the court automatically charge those

62
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95 (quoting Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132) (internal quotations
omitted).
63
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. While the court stated the State focused too much on the identity of the victim, the
court did not give any guidance on what would have been appropriate. Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d
at 95.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132.
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counts alternatively? The answer is difficult to determine because of
the lack of guidance by the Court of Appeals in Dubarry.
III.

TRANSFERRED INTENT THEORY

An examination of the transferred intent theory is crucial to
understand the court’s reasoning in Dubarry. Transferred intent is
not applicable to increase criminal liability—that is, the defendant
cannot be charged with transferred intent for the sole purpose of
including additional criminal charges.71 In New York, “when the
resulting death is of a third person who was not the defendant’s
intended” target (the “intended victim”), the defendant can still be
responsible for the unintended victim’s death (the “actual victim”)
“as if the intended victim were killed.”72 The defendant’s intent to
kill the intended victim will transfer to the actual victim, in turn
establishing the intent element of intentional murder.73
To
successfully prove intentional murder, the State must show that the
defendant, “[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, . . .
cause[d] the death of such person or of a third person . . . . “74 The
actual victim’s identity is irrelevant, as long as “the requisite intent to
kill is” sufficiently alleged and established, “and the death of” such
person results.75
The doctrine of transferred criminal intent exists to ensure the
defendant “will be prosecuted for the crime he or she intended to
commit even when, because of bad aim or some other ‘lucky
mistake,’ the intended target was not the actual victim.”76 While
transferred intent may be useful to convict a defendant of a crime, the
theory is permissible only when, “without the doctrine, the defendant
could not be convicted of the crime at issue because the mental and
physical elements do not concur as to either the intended or actual
victim.”77 Rather, the doctrine is meant to hold the defendant
accountable for a crime he or she has committed when all the

71

People v. Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1996).
Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913.
73
Id.
74
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2016).
75
35 N.Y. JUR. 2d Transferred Intent § 504, LexisNexis (database updated July 2016).
76
Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913 (citing People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984)).
77
Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913 (citing Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 998 (Md. 1993)).
72
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elements of that crime have been met, absent the intended victim’s
death (i.e., when the actual victim died instead).78
IV.

PRIOR COURT OF APPEALS CASES ON THE ISSUE OF
CHARGING INTENTIONAL AND DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE
MURDER

While Gallagher and Trappier both discussed the issue of
whether a court can submit both an intentional murder and depraved
indifference murder charge to the jury, these decisions did not
provide a definitive direction to the Departments of the Appellate
Division.79 Subsequently, the Departments adopted inconsistent
interpretations, which will be discussed further in Part V.
In 1987, the Court of Appeals in Gallagher held that the court
can only charge the defendant with intentional murder and depraved
indifference murder in the alternative.80 However, in Trappier,
decided in 1995, the court held that it could charge the jury with both
an intentional charge and a reckless charge in the conjunctive.81 The
Court of Appeals in Dubarry may have distinguished Trappier
because it was not a homicide case, but an assault case, and thus,
each charge had a distinct outcome as compared to the other.82
Nevertheless, the Appellate Division Departments never made such a
distinction. This section will discuss cases in which the Court of
Appeals considered whether the court could charge a defendant with
both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.
A.

People v. Gallagher

People v. Gallagher was the leading precedent the Court of
Appeals cited in Dubarry.83 In Gallagher, the court explained that it
is up to the jury, not the court, to decide the defendant’s mental state;
therefore, the court should submit the charges in the alternative to

78

Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d at 913.
See Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909; Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1131.
80
Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.
81
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133.
82
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95.
83
Id. at 94. Dubarry adopted similar reasoning, as well as the same conclusion: that the
court cannot submit intentional murder and depraved indifference charges in the conjunctive.
Id. at 95.
79
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enable the jury to properly determine the defendant’s mental state at
the time of the crime.84
In Gallagher, the court held that the jury could not convict the
accused of both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder
simultaneously; rather, the jury may convict him of one or the other.85
The defendant was a veteran New York City Police Officer, who
consumed large amounts of alcohol after an all-night celebration on
St. Patrick’s Day.86 That night, the defendant shot and killed a fellow
police officer, similar to how the victim was shot and killed in
Dubarry.87 The defendant was charged with two different counts of
murder in the second degree.88 The trial judge advised defense
counsel that, in conjunction with the indictments of intentional
murder and depraved mind murder, he also submitted additional
charges for the jury to consider.89 Specifically, these charges were
manslaughter in the first degree, as a lesser-included offense of
intentional murder, and manslaughter in the second degree, as a
lesser-included offense of depraved mind murder.90 Defense counsel
opposed the additional charges, arguing that this would allow the jury
to return two guilty verdicts for the same act with different requisite
mental states, and therefore, the court should submit the charges in
the alternative.91 The judge overruled defense counsel’s request, and
the jury returned a guilty verdict for both intentional murder and
manslaughter in the second degree, the former requiring an
intentional state of mind, and the latter requiring a reckless state of

84

Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 909. Prior to 1998, depraved indifference murder was previously called depraved
mind murder. The elements of the crime remained the same; it was simply a name change.
See Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 92 n.2.
86
Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 909-10.
89
Id. at 910.
90
Id. A lesser-included offense is a crime that contains similar “elements of a more
serious crime and” is therefore committed when someone is accused of committing the more
serious crime. Lesser-Included Offense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A
lesser-included offense is regarded as “the same offense as the greater offense.” Id. Thus, a
conviction or acquittal of either offense prevents a trial for the other offense. Id.
91
Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.
85
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mind.92 The Appellate Division, Second Department upheld the trial
court’s decision and an appeal ensued.93
The New York Court of Appeals in Gallagher held that a
defendant who intentionally shoots someone acts “with the conscious
objective of bringing about that result . . . .”94 That same defendant
cannot act with a conscious disregard that “a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such a result will occur.”95 The Court of
Appeals focused on the fact that the act (shooting) and the result
(death of the victim) were the same for both crimes.96 In other words,
the jury cannot convict the defendant of both intentional murder and
depraved indifference murder because this would result in two
murder convictions for one murder.97
The Court of Appeals in Gallagher further explained that the
Criminal Procedure Law provides that, if a defendant is indicted on
two counts that conflict with one another, the court must submit at
least one of those charges.98 However, the statute further provides
that if the court decides to charge the two inconsistent counts, it must
charge them in the alternative, which means the jury cannot find the
defendant guilty on both counts.99 The Gallagher court emphasized
that it was the jury’s responsibility to decide if the defendant
possessed either mental state at the time of the event in question.100
The court further explained that this rationale applies to lesserincluded offenses as well.101 The Gallagher court held that the
defendant could not possess “more than one of the mental states on
the kaleidoscope of culpable mental states . . . .”102 The court noted
that because there was only one act (shooting), and one result (death),
two convictions for one act could not be valid.103

92
Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(1) (McKinney 2016) (stating “[a] person is guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree when: [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person
. . . .”).
93
Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.40(5) (McKinney 2016).
99
Id.
100
Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 910.
101
Id. at 911.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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Gallagher is consistent with the Dubarry holding in that the
defendant cannot be convicted of both intentional murder and
depraved indifference,104 and the Court of Appeals in Dubarry simply
reaffirmed its prior reasoning from Gallagher.
B.

People v. Trappier

A number of years later, in Trappier, the Court of Appeals
held that the jury could convict a defendant for both attempted assault
in the first degree (an intentional assault charge) and reckless
endangerment (a reckless assault charge).105 In this case, a dispute
arose between the defendant and a security guard.106 When the
defendant chucked a bottle in the lobby of an apartment building, the
security guard told the defendant to leave, to which the defendant
responded, “I’ll be back.”107 The defendant later returned and fired
three shots in the direction of the security guard.108 One bullet hit the
security guard in the leg, and the other went right past his ears.109
The State charged the defendant with attempted assault and reckless
endangerment, among other charges.110
The trial court in Trappier instructed the jury on attempted
first-degree assault, which required proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant intended “to cause serious physical injury” to the
security guard.111 On the other hand, reckless endangerment required
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
“recklessly created a grave risk of death to . . . [the security guard]
under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human
life.”112 Further, the court emphasized that someone “recklessly
creates a grave risk of death to another person when he is aware of
and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a
grave risk of death will result.”113

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132.
Id.
Id. at 1133 (emphasis added).
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/9

14

Montoro: People v. Dubarry

2017

PEOPLE V. DUBARRY

503

The defendant in Trappier was convicted on both reckless
endangerment and attempted assault counts.114 Defense counsel
argued to the judge that the jury’s conviction meant that the
defendant possessed both reckless and intentional mental states at the
time of the alleged act, and such conviction was mistaken because the
defendant could not have acted both intentionally and recklessly in
regard to the same action.115 The judge rejected defense counsel’s
theory that the states of mind were contradictory.116 However, the
Appellate Division, First Department reversed the trial court’s
decision, stating that the counts were legally inconsistent with each
other.117 The case was further appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals.118
The Court of Appeals in Trappier stated that the court must
examine whether the essential elements of each charge submitted
contradict each other.119 The court further explored the relevance and
impact of Gallagher, which was decided eight years before
Trappier.120
When applying the Gallagher reasoning to Trappier, the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the act (the shooting) was the
same for the reckless endangerment count and the attempted assault
count,121 but the similarities between Gallagher and Trappier ended
there. The Trappier court concluded that the attempted assault and
reckless endangerment counts each required two different results.122
The court reasoned that a defendant may intend one result to occur
(serious physical injury), while “recklessly creating a grave risk that a
different, more-serious result––death” occurs from such action.123
The Trappier court explained that the defendant may have fired his
weapon at the security guard harboring the intent to cause only
serious physical injury.124 The court stated that the defendant, in
firing his weapon, “simultaneously consciously disregarded a
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133.
Id.
Id.; see People v. Trappier, 616 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994).
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
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substantial and unjustifiable risk that, by so doing, he would create a
grave risk of a more severe outcome,” the security guard’s death.125
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals in Trappier reversed the
First Department decision and held that a court can charge a
defendant with both reckless and intentional charges when the
defendant’s act produces two distinct results.126
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry correctly distinguished its
facts from those in Trappier. Trappier did not involve a homicide,
but first-degree assault and reckless endangerment.127 Therefore, the
statutes required different mens rea and actus reus for attempted
assault and reckless endangerment charges; the former mens rea
requiring intent to cause serious physical injury and the latter
requiring reckless creation of a grave risk of death.128 Even though
the defendant may intend to cause serious physical injury and not
death, intent to inflict injury can still cause a more serious risk of
death.129 In Dubarry, by contrast, the depraved indifference and
intentional murder charges both required the end result of death.130
The Court of Appeals in Dubarry clarified that Gallagher and
Trappier involved different situations; however, the court did not
adequately differentiate these two cases.
V.

APPELLATE DIVISION SPLIT

In Gallagher and Trappier, the Court of Appeals discussed
whether the court may charge a defendant with both intentional
murder and depraved indifference murder.131 The court reached
seemingly different conclusions, which resulted in a split among the
four Departments of the Appellate Division.132 The First, Second,
and Fourth Departments all concluded that a court may charge a
defendant with both an intentional murder charge and a depraved
indifference murder charge, while the Third Department concluded
that a court can only charge a defendant with such crimes in the

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132-33.
Id.
Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 94.
See Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132; Gallagher, 508 N.E.2d at 909.
See discussion infra Section V.A.
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alternative.133 Thus, a jury could convict different defendants
committing the same crimes in the same state and under similar facts
with one or two murder charges, depending upon the Department in
which the case fell.
A.

Appellate Division Departments that Charged
Intentional Murder and Depraved Indifference
Murder in the Conjunctive

The First, Second, and Fourth Departments all held that a jury
may convict a defendant of both a depraved indifference charge and
intentional murder charge.134 The relevant decisions from each of
these Departments are discussed below.
1.

Appellate Division, First Department

The consensus in the First Department was that the court can
charge intentional murder and depraved indifference together.135
However, the First Department did not elaborate beyond stating the
holding.
a.

People v. Page

In People v. Page,136 the First Department affirmed a
defendant’s convictions of both intentional murder under a
transferred intent theory and depraved indifference murder.137 The
defendant argued that the First Department should reverse these
counts because they were not submitted to the jury as alternatives.138
The court reasoned that because more than one potential victim was
present at the time of the shooting, the jury could convict the
defendant of both murder counts.139 Because it was possible the
defendant possessed a different state of mind with respect to each
133

Id.
See discussion infra Section V. A.1-4.
135
See People v. Page, 880 N.Y.S.2d 287 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009); People v.
Monserate, 682 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998).
136
Page, 880 N.Y.S.2d 287. The defendant in Page was convicted of two counts of
murder in the second degree, among other charges. Id. at 288. The court did not develop the
facts any further.
137
Id. at 289.
138
Id.
139
Id.
134
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individual victim, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction on
both murder charges.140
b.

People v. Monserate

In People v. Monserate,141 the First Department affirmed that
there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of intentional
murder under the theory of transferred intent and depraved
indifference murder.142 The First Department held that the trial court
properly submitted the charges in the conjunctive rather than the
alternative because “more than one mens rea could have existed
simultaneously under the circumstances.”143 The court explained that
the defendant acted intentionally with regard to his intended victim
and caused the death of the actual victim, which satisfied the mens
rea element of intentional murder under the doctrine of transferred
intent.144 The First Department decided the defendant also acted with
depraved indifference in regard to the general public, including the
actual victim.145 For these reasons, the First Department affirmed the
trial court’s decision.146
2.

Appellate Division, Second Department

The Second Department held that the trial court could submit
to the jury a charge requiring an intentional mens rea and a charge
requiring a reckless mens rea in the conjunctive.147 In People v.
Douglas,148 the court reasoned that it could charge a defendant with
reckless assault and intentional assault in the conjunctive because the
defendant could act recklessly with respect to one victim while also
acting intentionally with respect to another victim.149

140

Page, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
682 N.Y.S.2d 25 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998). The defendant in Monserate was
convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree, among other charges. Id. at 26. The
court did not develop the facts any further.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Monserate, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
146
Id.
147
See Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d 57.
148
901 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010).
149
Id. at 61.
141
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In Douglas, a van with tinted windows double-parked in a
traffic lane in Brooklyn, New York on September 26, 2003.150 A
family (the Williamses) was in the van sitting with the passenger side
door open.151 The defendant started to back his vehicle into a parking
spot next to the van when he rolled over a glass bottle and hit Ms.
Williams with the flying glass from that bottle.152 Ms. Williams’s
son and brother confronted the defendant to ask for an apology.153
The defendant stepped out of his car, proceeded back in the vehicle,
turned the car around, and parked across the street from the van.154
He then exited his vehicle and ran across the street carrying a gun.155
The defendant fired his gun at the Williamses’ vehicle.156 “The
[defendant] pointed the gun through an open window and fired two
more shots . . . .”157 A police officer arrived, and a police chase
ensued, leading the police to catch the defendant.158
The prosecution charged the defendant with two counts of
assault in the first degree.159 The first count alleged that the
defendant “intended to cause serious physical injury” to the victim
with a deadly weapon.160 The second count alleged that the
defendant “recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of
death to” the victim.161 The jury convicted the defendant of depraved
indifference reckless assault, but he later appealed, stating that he
only acted intentionally towards Ms. Williams and her son.162 The
defendant further argued that while the evidence could support a
conviction of intentional assault under the transferred intent theory, it
could not support a conviction of reckless assault.163
The Douglas court stated, “[w]hether a criminal act is
intentional or reckless depends upon the relationship between the
perpetrator’s objective in committing the act and the result the act
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
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produces.”164 The court stated that “[o]rdinarily a defendant cannot
be guilty of both the intentional and reckless assault of the same
individual because a defendant cannot intend to cause serious
physical injury to a person and at the same time consciously
disregard a risk that he or she will succeed in doing so.”165 The
Douglas court noted that if the defendant harmed the intended victim,
created a grave risk to the intended victim’s life, was aware of such
risk but disregarded it, and ultimately caused serious physical injury
to the actual victim, that act constituted reckless assault.166 In other
words, the defendant may act with intent directed at one person,
while acting recklessly with respect to a different person.167 The
court found that the defendant acted with specific intent to kill or
injure his intended victims, and he “created a substantial,
unjustifiable, and grave risk of death,” not only to the victim but also
to the other occupants of the car.168 The court concluded that the
evidence would have supported a conviction of intentional assault
under the transferred intent theory and sufficiently supported a
conviction of depraved indifference reckless assault.169
3.

Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Fourth Department has likewise held that the court may
charge a defendant with intentional murder and depraved indifference
in the conjunctive, rather than in the alternative, adopting the same
reasoning as the First and Second Departments.
In People v. Henderson,170 the defendant appealed his murder
convictions, alleging the State improperly charged him with both
intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.171 The court
held that the defendant “intend[ing] to murder one victim when he
drove a vehicle into a crowd did not preclude a finding that he acted
with depraved indifference with respect to the three other victims

164
Id. at 60 (quoting People v. Atkinson, 799 N.Y.S.2d 125, 129 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t
2005) (internal quotations omitted)).
165
Douglas, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (emphasis added).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 61.
169
Id.
170
911 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010).
171
Id. at 522.
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. . . .”172 The court agreed with the First Department’s decision in
Page, reasoning that because there was “more than one potential
victim,” the defendant could possess different mental states with
respect to each victim.173 Therefore, the jury could indeed convict
the defendant of both depraved indifference and intentional
murder.174
B.

Appellate Division, Third Department: The Only
Department that Charged Intentional Murder and
Depraved Indifference Murder in the Alternative

The Third Department is the only Department of the New
York Appellate Division that held that in most cases, a court must
submit an intentional murder and depraved indifference murder
charge exclusively in the alternative.175 The court determined that the
jury’s role is to decide which mens rea the defendant possessed at the
time of the crime.176 Therefore, the jury cannot find that the
defendant acted both intentionally and recklessly with respect to the
same result.
The Third Department in People v. Molina177 held that the
trial court could submit an intentional murder charge and a depraved
indifference charge only in the alternative.178 In Molina, the
defendant and two other people, Ross and Knox, were at a nightclub
in Elmira in July 2008.179 A dispute erupted between Ross and an
additional group of men from South Carolina.180 Both groups went to
an apartment complex where they met up with additional groups
outside of the complex.181 One man saw the defendant pull out a gun
and started to shoot.182 One bullet penetrated the apartment complex

172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id. at 523.
Id.
See Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d 331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 334.
Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
Id. at 335.
Id.
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and struck Maurice Davis in the head while he was in his apartment,
ultimately causing his death.183
The State charged the defendant with two counts of murder in
the second degree, and he was convicted of manslaughter in the first
degree184 and depraved indifference murder.185 The defendant
appealed to the Third Department, arguing that the trial court erred by
not submitting the charges in the alternative.186 Agreeing with the
defendant, the court reasoned that “[t]win-count indictments . . .
charging both intentional homicide and depraved indifference murder
. . . should be rare[, with t]win-count submissions to a jury, even
rarer.”187 The court stated that when the State presents both murder
counts to the court, the trial court “should presume that the
defendant’s . . . [acts] fall[] only within one category of murder
. . . .”188
The Molina court held that while the defendant intended to
kill at least one of the men from South Carolina, he accidentally
killed Davis.189 The court explained that as a result, the defendant
could be convicted of either intentional murder under the theory of
transferred intent or depraved indifference murder by shooting into
an occupied apartment building; however, the defendant may not be
found guilty of both.190 Concluding otherwise, the court noted,
would:
take[] the issue of determining [the] defendant’s mens
rea out of the hands of the jury, and invite[] the jury to
simultaneously convict [the] defendant of killing
Davis both intentionally and with a depraved mind,
when it should have been instructed that it could find
defendant guilty of either intentional murder or
depraved indifference murder . . . .191

183

Id.
Manslaughter in the first degree is a lesser-included offense of intentional murder and
thus also requires intent, while depraved indifference is not premised on the mens rea of
intent. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2016).
185
Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
186
Id. at 336.
187
Id. at 335 (quoting Suarez, 844 N.E.2d at 731 (internal quotations omitted)).
188
Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
189
Id. at 336.
190
Id. at 335.
191
Id.
184
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For these reasons, the court disagreed with the other three
departments and held that the court could not submit the depraved
indifference and intentional murder charges to the jury together.192
C.

The Effect of Dubarry on Prior First, Second, and
Fourth Department Cases

The Dubarry court did not satisfactorily resolve the split
among the Departments. As discussed above, the First, Second, and
Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division all held that a court
may submit intentional murder and depraved indifference murder
charges together for a single murder. This rule conflicts with the
Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Dubarry, rendering most cases
that were decided in conflict with Dubarry no longer good law if the
defendant’s action in the case resulted in a single murder. Thus, for
the future, it is questionable what attorneys at the Appellate Division
level will argue. For homicide charges, Dubarry seems clear: one
victim and one murder results in the State’s charging two different
murder charges in the alternative. However, if the case is not a
homicide and is instead an assault, analogous to Trappier, then it
seems that as long as the actus reus was different (meaning two
distinct results could occur), then the State may charge the defendant
with the two different assault charges in the conjunctive. However,
this concept is problematic, especially when every case and set of
facts are different. Essentially, the State will take the Trappier side,
and the defense will take the Gallagher/Dubarry approach. It is
challenging to take a cookie cutter approach, making it difficult not
only for the Appellate Divisions to apply the law but also for the
Court of Appeals.
VI.

THE INCONSISTENCY WHICH LED TO “TWIN-COUNT
INDICTMENTS” IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

Scholars and professionals, including judges, predicted that an
issue would arise if courts allowed the State to charge defendants
with both depraved indifference and intentional murder.193 It is likely

192

Id. at 336.
See Sweet v. Bennett, 353 F.3d 135, 143-48 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, J., concurring); 1
N.Y. LAW OF DOM. VIO. Murder in the Second Degree, Depraved Indifference Murder §
193
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that poor drafting of the statute by the New York Legislature
contributed to this problem.194 The statutory elements of intentional
murder are self-explanatory: a defendant must intend to cause a
person’s death, and that death must occur.195 On the other hand,
depraved indifference was not clearly defined in the statute, and was
left up to the New York courts to decide.196 This section will discuss
the different interpretations of depraved indifference murder, along
with the profound effect of these varying interpretations on the
criminal justice system.
In New York, a person is guilty of depraved indifference
murder when, “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference
to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of
another person.”197 From the 1880s to the 1980s, the New York
Court of Appeals agreed that depraved indifference was a mental
state distinct from the mental state of recklessness, even though
recklessness was included in the definition of “depraved
indifference.”198
However, in People v. Register,199 the New York Court of
Appeals held that depraved indifference was not a separate culpable
mental state.200
The Court of Appeals stated that depraved
indifference does not refer to either the actus reus or mens rea.201 The
Register court stated that when the court previously held that
depraved indifference murder was not a culpable mental state, it
“objectively define[d] the circumstances which must exist to elevate
a homicide from manslaughter to murder.”202
In People v. Sanchez,203 the Court of Appeals applied the
Register test, which resulted in a dissent by Judge Rosenblatt that
2:77, Westlaw (3d ed. database updated Nov. 2016) [hereinafter Murder in the Second
Degree].
194
Bennett, 353 F.3d at 144-45 (Walker, J., concurring).
195
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 2016).
196
See Feingold, 852 N.E.2d at 1164-65.
197
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2016).
198
See People v. Poplis, 281 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1972); People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E.
497 (N.Y. 1924); Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120 (1854) (holding that recklessness and
depraved indifference were distinct mental states).
199
457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983).
200
Id. at 708.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
777 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2002).
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heavily criticized this test.204 He stated, “In concluding that depraved
indifference murder has a mens rea of ordinary recklessness, the
[c]ourt in Register essentially took the ‘depraved’ out of depraved
indifference, so that depraved indifference murder is virtually
indistinguishable from reckless manslaughter.”205 Judge Rosenblatt
argued that the broad definition of depraved indifference would lead
courts to charge juries with both intentional murder and depraved
indifference murder, leading depraved indifference murder to lose its
true meaning.206 Later cases such as People v. Gonzalez207 carved out
exceptions to the Register rule when differentiating between
intentional and depraved indifference murder.208 In Gonzalez, the
court held that when a defendant purposefully intends to kill
someone, depraved indifference is not present.209 Thus, the Court of
Appeals attempted to draw a line between conduct that evinced a
depraved indifference to human life and conduct that was
intentional.210
Eventually, the Court of Appeals in People v. Feingold211
expressly overruled Register and decided that depraved indifference
murder was a culpable mental state and was not an objective set of
circumstances.212 The court explained that “depraved indifference is
best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life – a
willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one
simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not.”213 With
Feingold overruling Register, critics were hopeful that courts
charging both murder counts would be a thing of the past.214
Unfortunately, that is not true as demonstrated by this note.
Throughout the Register period, judges reasoned that
prosecutors were receiving an unfair advantage over defendants
because they could attempt to obtain two convictions rather than

204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 218 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 227 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 232-33 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
807 N.E.2d 273 (N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 276-77.
Id.
852 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1168 (internal quotations omitted).
See Murder in the Second Degree, supra note 193.
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one.215 Judge Bellacosa in his dissent in People v. Roe216 correctly
predicted that an increased number of prosecutors would charge a
defendant with both depraved indifference and intentional murder.217
Additionally, Judge Rosenblatt dissented from Sanchez expressing
similar concerns:
[D]epraved indifference murder counts have become
routine escorts to intentional murder counts . . . .
....
[T]he charge of depraved indifference murder,
intended to be a rare indictment for a rare breed of
criminal, has undeniably become a tactical weapon of
choice that distorts the Penal Law and skews the
process of indictment, trial and plea . . . . 218
Judge Rosenblatt expressed concerns he and many other judges had
in cases prior to Feingold. While the majority in Feingold was
probably hopeful for a change, as evidenced by Dubarry, defendants
are still wrongfully charged with both intentional and depraved
indifference murder.
VII.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DUBARRY

The Court of Appeals in Dubarry attempted to resolve the
split among the Appellate Division Departments on the issue of
whether a court can charge a defendant with both intentional murder
and depraved indifference murder for the same killing. Prior to
Dubarry, the First, Second, and Fourth Departments all agreed that
the court could submit a murder charge requiring an intentional mens
rea and a murder charge requiring a depraved indifference mens rea
in the conjunctive.219 However, the Third Department disagreed,
instead finding that courts can only submit these charges in the
alternative.220 As the Third Department explained in Molina, a
defendant cannot kill with both an intentional and a depraved
indifference state of mind.221
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id.
542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989).
Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 619 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 224 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting).
See discussion supra Section V.
Molina, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
Id. at 336.
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The Court of Appeals in Dubarry agreed with the Third
Department: the defendant can only possess either an intentional or a
depraved indifference state of mind, but not both.222 The Dubarry
court emphasized that submitting the charges in the conjunctive
deprives the jury of its role in determining the defendant’s state of
mind at the time the murder or act was committed.223
The Dubarry holding is consistent with the dissents in
Sanchez and Roe.224 However, Dubarry, Sanchez, and Roe all
involved murder charges.225 Would it make a difference if the
charges were assault charges? The answer is likely yes, according to
the Court of Appeals in Trappier, which held that the court can
charge a defendant with both attempted assault and reckless
endangerment.226 The Trappier court examined the mens rea and
actus reus of the charges and concluded that each charge required a
different result.227 In such a case, the defendant could intend to cause
serious physical injury, while also recklessly causing a grave risk of
death to another person.228 The Dubarry court came to the right
decision and Trappier should not be overruled; however, the Dubarry
court should have explained further how it came to its decision.
Judges have pointed out that New York Court of Appeals
cases wrongly focus on the act of the crime.229 However, it is hard to
distinguish the results in a murder case from each other – can a
defendant intend to kill someone while also recklessly causing his
death?
The fact-specific nature of the cases makes it extremely
challenging to create a definite rule. However, even in Dubarry, the
Court of Appeals did not seem to resolve the Appellate Division split.
Dubarry is just another decision specifically ruling on the facts of the
case. Defense counsel cannot guarantee to his client that a judge will
not charge him with both intentional murder and depraved
222

Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 95.
Id.
224
See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
225
See Dubarry, 31 N.E.3d at 89; Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 610; Sanchez, 777 N.E.2d at 204.
226
Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1132.
227
Id. at 1132-34 (stating that reckless endangerment required the defendant to recklessly
create a grave risk of death to another person under circumstances evincing a depraved
indifference to human life, while attempted assault required the defendant to intend serious
injury).
228
Id.
229
See Bennett, 353 F.3d at 143-48 (Walker, J., concurring).
223
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indifference murder because it depends on how fact-specific the case
is and what precedent the judge applies that day. While the Dubarry
court rightfully held that, on the facts of that case, a trial court cannot
charge a defendant with both intentional and depraved indifference
murder, the Dubarry court did not resolve the split among the
Appellate Divisions and did not make it easier to resolve future cases
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals should have
explained the rationale for its holding and furnished an in-depth
analysis as to the significance of the differences between Gallagher
and Trappier. This would have provided meaningful guidance not
only to the Departments of the Appellate Division, but also to the
trial courts.
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